Lest we forget ... (2009 Archives)

Source: http://www.ibnlive.com

Soldier, Heal thyself : Ajai Shukla

Col Ajai Shukla is a retired officer of the Indian Army, and is one of the best known Defence Correspondents in India. His stint with NDTV resulted in numerous highly acclaimed reports. He currently writes for Business Standard.

 

Figuring out the state of an army’s morale is easy. All it takes is a couple of drinks with two groups of people: the officers and the enlisted men. If the chatter is mainly about sports and professional competitions; ongoing training; and about how much tougher and smarter they are than their rival units, morale is high. On the other hand, if talk centres on pay and allowances; promotions and postings; and on the world outside the army, you can bet money that morale is low. Applying this yardstick to the Indian Army I believe the morale of officers is low, while that of the jawans is high.

In this gloomy assessment I have illustrious company. The new Chief of Army Staff, General VK Singh, on assuming office on the 1st of April, has wisely identified the army’s “internal health” as his key focus. Pointing out that an internally vibrant army would easily swat aside external threats, the army chief has promised to revitalize traditions, core values and the army’s ethos.

Earlier chiefs, some as well-intentioned as General VK Singh, have embarked on similar paths. General K Sundarji, on taking over as chief in 1986, wrote to army officers individually, urging them to follow their professional convictions and promising to tolerate dissent. But that led nowhere as actions failed to follow words. Today, as the new chief implicitly accepts, the army has become a personality cult where officers either conform to the inclinations of the boss or get weeded out. Originality and eccentricity, those priceless attributes of a successful military leader, have been rendered extinct by a dull, humourless routine that is set --- Congress Party fashion --- by what the boss thinks his boss wants.

Keeping the officers in line is a terrible God called the Annual Confidential Report before which even the brightest and most capable officer must kneel or be scythed down. While annual reports are an evaluation tool in many professions, the army has accorded the ACR absolute control of an officer’s career. Considering that this primacy is born of the army’s laudable quest for an impartial, empirical evaluation system, it is ironic that the ACR has turned into a monster of subjectivity. If the boss is unhappy with an officer --- for any reason whatsoever --- a single lukewarm ACR can sink a brilliant career.

Dismantling this tyranny, and unlocking the potential of his officer corps, is the task ahead for General VK Singh. This is easier said than done. Blocking any radical change is the tribal ethos of the Indian Army. An officer belongs first to his regiment or battalion; only after that is he an Indian Army officer. An army chief’s first duty is towards the regiment and battalion that nurtured him; reforming the army conflicts with the role of regimental patriarch.

When General JJ Singh, an infantry officer from the Maratha Light Infantry, took over as chief, the honour guard that welcomed him to South Block was from the Marathas. So was his aide-de-camp and most of his personal staff. During his term Army Headquarters strengthened the infantry-friendly promotion policies of his infantry predecessors. The tenure of his artillery successor, General Deepak Kapoor, saw the Corps of Artillery quickly muscling out the infantry as the flavour of the month. Promotion policy tilted in favour of the artillery. Upwardly mobile artillery officers were quickly posted into friendly environments, under “friendly” superiors, to ease their paths towards higher rank.

These are only the most recent examples of the army’s longstanding patriarchal tradition that General VK Singh can now embrace or dismantle. A key step would be the creation of a clearly enunciated promotion policy, printed as a manual and sanctioned by the government, to ensure that each successive chief cannot tinker with the policy to suit his constituency. Today, 63 years after independence, the military has no promotion manual; policy exists only in a constantly revised torrent of letters from the Military Secretary’s branch.

The other major change that General VK Singh could implement is the reversing of promotion quotas to higher rank: the “Mandalisation” of the army as it is evocatively referred to. From the institution of the Prussian General Staff in the early eighteenth century, professional militaries have employed the criterion of merit alone to select their senior command. For over half a century, so did the Indian Army; but recently, in a burst of patrimonial fervour, quotas were instituted to ensure that each combat arm got its share of the senior ranks. Initiated by artillery and infantry chiefs to safeguard the interests of their officers, the quotas are now favouring less talented officers of other arms.

Few chiefs would voluntarily divest themselves of power but, paradoxically, the institution of the COAS would be greatly strengthened by transparency and the absence of discretion in promotions and postings. It would also free army chiefs from accusations of prejudice; a lever that MoD officials --- and in one well-known case, a defence minister --- have successfully employed to demand favours for their own candidates.

 

Source:http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/ajai-shukla-soldier-heal-thyself/390930/

India’s Stalled Arms Buying Leaves Its Army Outgunned by China

By James Rupert

March 12 (Bloomberg) -- India, which has tripled its defense spending in a race against China’s military buildup, is having trouble converting the funding into weapons and equipment its military says are urgently needed.

The government in five years has canceled two tenders for artillery guns, a contract for ammunition propellant and two helicopter tenders, together worth at least $4 billion. No contract exceeding $100 million has been awarded through competitive bidding in at least 23 years, said military analyst V.K. Kapoor. Defense Ministry spokesman Sitanshu Kar said he couldn’t immediately identify the last such deal.

India’s “military capacity and preparedness are being reduced because of the inadequacy of the procurement process,” said Uday Bhaskar, director of the National Maritime Foundation, a New Delhi research institute on strategic issues. The military’s upgrading is “on hold and its obsolescence is increasing.”

The cancellations have disrupted attempted weapons sales by Textron Inc.’s Bell Helicopter unit in Fort Worth, BAE Systems Plc and South Africa’s Denel Ltd. Bhaskar said they have hurt troop readiness along more than 4,200 kilometers (2,600 miles) of Himalayan frontiers, where India has fought three full-blown wars with Pakistan and one with China.

India took 20 years to negotiate a 2004 contract for jet trainers, even as 157 pilots died in three decades of jet fighter crashes blamed partly on inadequate training craft.

Obsolete Weapons

The Defense Ministry, which wields the world’s 10th-largest military budget, has surrendered 3 percent to 9 percent of its announced budget in each of the past seven years because it couldn’t spend all the money allocated for arms, according to a January report by the New Delhi office of accounting firm KPMG and the Confederation of Indian Industry. Half of India’s weapons are obsolete, the report said.

China has almost quadrupled its official defense spending since 2000 to $78 billion for fiscal 2011, 7.5 percent more than in the previous year. India will spend $32 billion on defense this year, triple its 2000 outlay and 4 percent more than in fiscal 2010.

India has bought no artillery for more than 23 years, a period during which the government has sought to buy more than 1,500 155 mm guns for use mainly along the Pakistani and Chinese borders. Such guns were used to defeat Pakistan in a 1999 conflict at Kargil in Kashmir; India would have had too few had that fight grown into a full-scale war, said Kapoor, who is also a retired army lieutenant general.

Howitzer Delays

India’s military is adequately prepared on its borders and will benefit from an accelerating modernization program, Minister of State for Defense M.M. Pallam Raju said at a conference with defense companies in New Delhi on Feb. 16. “In the past five years we have created a faster, more transparent procurement process,” he said.

That process is being tested as India’s air force conducts flight trials in the world’s biggest fighter-jet purchase in 15 years. Chicago-based Boeing Co., Lockheed Martin Corp. and four European builders are vying under a 2007 tender to sell India 126 warplanes worth $11 billion.

India is expected to sign a separate deal for 29 naval MiG- 29 fighters during this week’s visit by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

John Giese, a spokesman for Bethesda, Maryland-based Lockheed, called the fighter tender “one of the most challenging competitions in the history of fighter aviation.” Given the complexity, “the competition has been very efficient, transparent and professionally managed,” Boeing spokeswoman Mary Ann Brett said in an e-mail.

European Competitors

Lockheed and Boeing are competing with Paris-based Dassault Aviation SA, Stockholm-based Saab AB, European Aeronautic, Defense & Space Co., which has headquarters in Paris and Munich, and Moscow-based OAO United Aircraft Corp.

While the military says rules last amended in November let it sign a contract within 20 to 34 months, it is too early to judge their effectiveness, said Gurpal Singh, a deputy director general for the industry federation in New Delhi.

The air force asked the government in 1983 to order advanced jet trainers because pilots taught mainly in subsonic jets were losing control of supersonic MiG-21 fighters that were more than three times faster. Political and bureaucratic battles under 11 prime ministers added to the delays before BAE Hawk jets were purchased.

India’s main political blocs -- led by the Congress Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) -- have fought over arms buying since 1987. Indian newspapers reported then that Swedish artillery builder Bofors, now a unit of London-based BAE, bribed officials to buy its guns. The scandal scuttled most of the deal and helped drive the Congress government of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to defeat in 1989 elections.

Reviewing Deals

India was still seeking artillery in 2004 when Congress was elected, and halted bidding as it reviewed defense deals under the previous BJP administration. When police investigated Pretoria-based Denel for paying illegal commissions in winning a 2002 army order for rifles, the government blacklisted the state-owned company.

Four more foreign companies were barred from defense contracts last year, after the Central Bureau of Investigation said they were being investigated on suspicion of bribery. That forced Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd. out of the race, leaving London-based BAE as a single vendor and prompting officials to halt the tender.

--With assistance from Gopal Ratnam in Washington. Editors: Anne Swardson, Mark Williams

-0- Mar/11/2010 19:30 GMT

To contact the reporter on this story: James Rupert in New Delhi at jrupert3@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Bill Austin at billaustin@bloomberg.net,

Source: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-11/india-s-stalled-arms-buying-leaves-its-army-outgunned-by-china.html

Ajai Shukla: The cost of Antony's halo

Sarojini Naidu famously observed that it cost India millions to keep Gandhi in poverty. It is harder to determine what this country pays to perpetuate Defence Minister AK Antony’s reputation for honesty, but the monetary penalty alone is thousands of crores per year. Here’s how it adds up. Antony’s obsessive quest for unblemished weapons procurement has delayed the acquisition of artillery and anti-aircraft guns, fighters, submarines, night fighting gear and a host of equipment upgrades.

With arms inflation at 15 per cent per annum, a five-year delay means that India pays twice what it should have. And when that equipment is obtained through government-to-government purchases and other single-vendor contracts, the cost is about 25 per cent more than it would have been in competitive bidding. Conservatively estimating that delays afflict just half of the defence ministry’s Rs 50,000 crore procurement budget, India buys Rs 25,000 crore worth of weaponry for 125 per cent more than what it should have paid.

Over and above that figure is the cost to national prestige and the devaluation of India’s military deterrent when — as in the wake of the 26/11 terror strikes in Mumbai — India’s armed forces are unprepared for immediate strikes. That happened on Antony’s watch.

To inconvenient questions about procurement delays, Antony declares that “India is a democracy” and “we have to ensure full transparency”. Point out to him that many democracies manage timely procurement in a transparent manner, and you will get a patronising, “Don’t worry, we are doing all that is necessary to safeguard the security of the country.”

After five years of insensibility to Antony’s disastrous custodianship of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Congress party seems to be realising that in India’s deteriorating security environment, Antony’s functioning might leave the party with having to account for a military embarrassment. Last week, Congress party spokesperson Manish Tewari wrote an opinion piece in a national daily, arguing for all the changes that Antony has assiduously blocked during his five disastrous years in office.

Tewari called for “reforms that are visionary”; treating Indian private industry on a par with the public sector; and “drastically retooling” the Department of Defence Production. Though qualified as his personal views, the article represented growing opinion within the Congress party.

Is it fair, Antony’s defenders will ask, to pin the blame entirely on him? After all, George Fernandes had publicly declared that fear of the three C’s — the CAG, the CVC and the CBI — held back MoD bureaucrats from making decisions. But Antony, like no other defence minister before him, endangers national security by his otherwise laudable fetish for probity. The message that flows out of Antony’s office and seeps through the procurement department is: cancel an ongoing procurement at the first hint of irregularity. It does not matter whether the suspicion has been planted by a rival arms dealer; a paid-for Parliamentary question; or a letter from an MP which has clearly been dictated by someone who possesses every detail of the tender in question. Just put the process on indefinite hold.

One MoD official asked me: Point out one official who has been punished for delaying the procurement of even the most vitally needed equipment. But if I am seen to move a file quickly, the defence minister’s office will ask, “What is the hurry. It seems almost as if you have a stake in that deal.”

Then there is Antony’s obvious bewilderment about the technical issues of the military, a crashing ignorance that cannot be condoned in India’s top military decision-maker. Antony’s apologists cite his preoccupation with party matters; but that is hardly convincing. His predecessor, Pranab Mukherjee, who had an immeasurably larger role in the party and national affairs, handled the MoD with skill and knowledge.

At a lunch, three years ago, I asked the Australian defence minister why his air force was buying F/A-18F Super Hornet fighters when Australia was already in line for the futuristic F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which was nearing completion. His answer: Australia’s ageing F-111 fighters would be retiring in 2010; since the F-35 project was running a couple of years late, 24 new Super Hornets would be inducted to retain Australian capability. (The Super Hornets are reaching Australia next month.)

Contrast that urgency with Antony’s “we-will-consider” approach, even though India faces a greater chance of military confrontation with Pakistan or China than Australia does with New Zealand or Papua and New Guinea.

Antony’s personal image and goals are damaging national security and the image of his party. If electoral seat adjustment and managing state-level dissidence is his particular skill, let him move out of that crucial corner office in South Block and give him a place in the Congress party office.

After Neville Chamberlain had miserably failed to reign in Hitler in 1939, British MP Leo Amery echoed the words of Oliver Cromwell in calling for Chamberlain’s head at a memorable session of the British Parliament: “You have sat here too long for any good you are doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!”

Mr Antony?

Source: http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/ajai-shuklacostantony%5Cs-halo/386534/

Ajai Shukla is an Indian Defence Analyst who is a retired Colonel from the Indian Army. He currently writes for Business Standard.